Societies Without Borders
Volume 10 | Issue 1

Article 10

2015

Review of Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by
Other Means (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press 2014)
Kubilay Y. Arin Mr
Portland State University, kubilayarin@hotmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Arin, Kubilay Y.. 2015. "Review of Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press 2014)." Societies Without Borders 10 (1).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol10/iss1/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Cross Disciplinary Publications at Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Societies Without Borders by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Arin: Review Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights

Review of Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2014)
Jennifer Curtis, author of Human Rights as War by Other Means,
traces the use of rights discourse in Northern Ireland's politics from the local
civil rights campaigns of the 1960s to present-day activism for truth recovery
and LGBT equality (p. 33). While reading this remarkable study, I asked
myself to what extent her criticism of human “rights discourse has functioned
as a war by other means” (p. 4) in Northern Ireland. The end to the IRA’s
military campaign eventually led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA),
signed between the British and Irish governments, that brought a fragile but
enduring peace to Northern Ireland. Dr. Curtis maintains that the Northern
Ireland conflict remains “unique” in different angles, most notably the
circumstance that “non-state actors” were responsible for “many casualties”
(pp. 25-33). Though, certain topics are not “unique” to Ulster. Her political
question is whether and how people use the language of human rights to
legitimate violence which is challenged throughout the globe, at any time,
particularly considering “humanitarian interventions”. She rejects that “human
rights” are exclusively debated as “the only kind of politics”, but she brings
forward that its “discourse” has overshadowed “other global issues”. She also
believes that “historical analysis” of this peace settlement in Northern Ireland
enables us to think in more concrete terms on the consequences of “legal or
abstract principles” (p. 34).
To categorize the conflicting communities in Northern Ireland, she
prefers the terms “political,” “ethno-political,” or “national.” As an
anthropologist, she recognizes that interviewees formed her “understanding of
the conflict”. Most of them were secular working-class, which are religious in
name. As a consequence, she rejects the categorization as “sectarian” in her
analysis. For her it may serve to “describing specific phenomena, like
religious discrimination”. Nonetheless, she underlines that religion
characterizes “political identity” (p. 43). In her view, she would have seen “the
conflict differently if she had worked with the Orange Order or a Catholic
organization” as “religious institutions have had contested degrees of
importance and influence within political groupings over time”.
Civil rights discourse in Northern Ireland serves as a reminder “against
uncritically accepting discursive claims”. Even though it simultaneously warns
of “purism about human rights politics”. The Civil rights movement in Ulster
is integrated in the “global expansion of human rights advocacy and law since
the end of the twentieth century”. Like other critics, she tries to get to the
bottom of “the proliferation or politicization of human rights.” While she
remains “suspicious of rights talk”, she rejects warnings about “third
generation” or “invented” rights which according to her miss the political
foundations and the achievements of “the human rights project”. Thus, the
allegation of “politicization” often incriminates the rights of minorities who
attempt to obtain legitimate “access to both rhetorical power and legal
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authority”. These entitlements shall provide political, economic, and legal
equality. By rejection, instead of “critically assessing”, opponents limit human
right demands, Curtis claims (pp. 103-8).
For adherents of “armed struggle, the Irish nation’s right to sovereignty
and self-determination has ideological precedence over other rights”. The
anthropologist stresses that “the primacy of national rights means that
jurisdictional differences in legal rights are less important than sovereignty”
(p. 112). Until the GFA, the Irish constitution claimed sovereignty over the
whole island, this constitutional requirement rests “symbolic” for Jennifer
Curtis. After the referendum in 1998, those articles granted citizenship to
northern Irish, giving up on reunification. She upholds “that communal rights
have succeeded at the expense of economic rights” (p. 94). With regard to
history, she assumes that “anti-Catholic discrimination created inequalities
between nationalists and unionists, making class-based alliances difficult” (p.
100). Even though “class structures are converging” due to antidiscrimination legislation and enforcement since the 1970s. Nevertheless,
Northern Ireland stays one of the least developed regions in the UK, while the
Republic of Ireland has not recovered economically since the 2008 financial
crisis.
On the preferability of war by rhetorical means over war by physical
violence, she writes that nonetheless a war by rhetoric “creates vulnerabilities
for the future”. To the question if renewed inter-communal violence in
Northern Ireland is likely, she responds that “some new and former
combatants continue to pursue armed struggle, and inter-communal clashes
continue”. For example, Loyalists took to the streets because of the flag issue;
republican opponents to the Good Friday Agreements planned bomb attacks in
Belfast. For her, the great danger consists of a return to violence and she puts
the questions, “how intense it will be, and how much it will cost: in lives, and
in people’s diminished political capacity, quality of life, and economic
opportunity” (pp. 128-9).
Whether the Good Friday Agreements (GFA) is doomed to fail, she
asks if the GFA has been “the best agreement” that the signatories could reach.
But unless there is public honesty about what the GFA does not achieve, and
political will to address its gaps, she assumes it is “a fragile peace” (p. 201).
The short detention of Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams - on his alleged role in
terrorist acts in 1972 - may prove the agreement flawed (pp. 153-8). Adams
denies ever being in the IRA but was the crucial interlocutor in enabling Sinn
Féin to secure a ceasefire from paramilitaries in the mid-1990s. Curtis blames
all sides to have failed “to develop an approach to truth recovery” which
shows “that the GFA has not transformed the conflict”. She claims the GFA
may be “a station on the way to a more permanent settlement”. For a
successful peace accord, the parties to the treaty should first analyze and
resolve “the GFA’s flaws and oversights”. In general, the main concern rests
in “maintaining the GFA”, disregarding “other political goals”. As the result
of a long negotiation process, the GFA came about that is why she understands
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its value and defense. But she draws attention to the fact “that beneficiaries of
this particular settlement are unwilling to entertain alternatives because change
could threaten their positions”. Their ignorance oppresses constructive
criticism, and eliminates the evaluation “of alterations or alternatives” (pp.
207-11).
She describes the GFA as having produced a “minimal” peace (p. 25).
In her view, the basic characteristics of a “maximal” peace would be “robust
peace that politics and society enable, or at least allow, citizens to engage in
disagreements and pursue political goals”. Vital and essential are “institutions
and practices that enable political agency, rather than structural or direct
violence”. Eventually, this is theory – “in practice, building institutions and
practices takes time, effort, and continuing renewal”. To the contrary, failure
would result in “collective rights … [to] authorize and reproduce compulsion
within groups”. So when daily life rests on “survival” and membership in the
nationalist or unionist camps, “publicly challenging the failures of established
politics is dangerous”, Curtis points out. Last but not least, she summarizes
that “[w]hen the institutions of peace reproduce these categories as the basis
for legitimate political expression, other experiences and politics are further
marginalized—and ‘choice’ becomes even closer to meaningless” (p.21).
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